Analyzing a Supreme Court Decision – Fall 2020
It is important that you familiarize yourself with the Supreme Court, as they have the ability to change the Constitution on a daily basis. The following readings and questions should help you to understand what their decisions say and how they come down. This assignment is worth 80 total points (8% of your course grade).
Read the recent Supreme Court case, Comcast v. NAAOM, that is also attached to the assignment details in Canvas. The last slide in the Chapter 1 PowerPoint and in Part III of the Chapter 1 audio.
1. Who wrote the majority opinion in this case and when was the case decided? (6 Points)
2. Briefly describe the facts of the original case for me that lead us to the Supreme Court, including the results at the lower federal court(s). (Solid paragraph in length total – 9 Points)
3. What was the essential issue (one key question of law) the Supreme Court was addressing? (8 Points)
4. What did the Supreme Court decide (how did they answer the issue question)? (8 Points)
5. What three general bases (areas of support) did the court rely on to reach their conclusion? Hint: there’re connected in a single sentence. (9 Points)
6. How did the private right of action arise under §1981? (6 points)
7. What standard was ESN arguing for and what other statute provided support for that standard? (9 points)
8. What does the court say about the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework? (8 Points)
9. Did the Supreme Court determine that ESN in fact had no case? Briefly explain. (8 Points)
10. Were there any other Supreme Court opinions written with this case? If so, please identify the main author(s) and what type(s) of opinions they were? (9 Points)
XXXXXXXXXXComcast Corp. v. National Assn. of African American-Owned Media (03/23/2020)
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1 Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal e
ors, in order that
co
ections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 18–1171
COMCAST CORPORATION, PETITIONER v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 23, 2020]
JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.
Few legal principles are better established than the rule
equiring a plaintiff to establish causation. In the law of
torts, this usually means a plaintiff must first plead and
then prove that its injury would not have occu
ed “but for”
the defendant’s unlawful conduct. The plaintiffs before us
suggest that 42 U. S. C. §1981 departs from this traditional
a
angement. But looking to this particular statute’s text
and history, we see no evidence of an exception.
I
This case began after negotiations between two media
companies failed. African-American entrepreneur Byron
Allen owns Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), the op-
erator of seven television networks—Justice Central.TV,
Comedy.TV, ES.TV, Pets.TV, Recipe.TV, MyDestina-
tion.TV, and Cars.TV. For years, ESN sought to have Com-
cast, one of the nation’s largest cable television conglomer-
ates, ca
y its channels. But Comcast refused, citing lack
of demand for ESN’s programming, bandwidth constraints,
and its preference for news and sports programming that
https:
Recipe.TV
https:
Comedy.TV
https:
Central.TV
2 COMCAST CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
ESN didn’t offer.
With bargaining at an impasse, ESN sued. Seeking bil-
lions in damages, the company alleged that Comcast sys-
tematically disfavored “100% African American-owned me-
dia companies.” ESN didn’t dispute that, during
negotiations, Comcast had offered legitimate business rea-
sons for refusing to ca
y its channels. But, ESN con-
tended, these reasons were merely pretextual. To help ob-
scure its true discriminatory intentions and win favor with
the Federal Communications Commission, ESN asserted,
Comcast paid civil rights groups to advocate publicly on its
ehalf. As relevant here, ESN alleged that Comcast’s be-
havior violated 42 U. S. C. §1981(a), which guarantees,
among other things, “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens.”
Much motions practice followed. Comcast sought to dis-
miss ESN’s complaint, and eventually the district court
agreed, holding that ESN’s pleading failed to state a claim
as a matter of law. The district court twice allowed ESN a
chance to remedy its complaint’s deficiencies by identifying
additional facts to support its case. But each time, the court
concluded, ESN’s efforts fell short of plausibly showing
that, but for racial animus, Comcast would have contracted
with ESN. After three rounds of pleadings, motions, and
dismissals, the district court decided that further amend-
ments would prove futile and entered a final judgment for
Comcast.
The Ninth Circuit reversed. As that court saw it, the dis-
trict court used the wrong causation standard when as-
sessing ESN’s pleadings. A §1981 plaintiff doesn’t have to
point to facts plausibly showing that racial animus was a
“but for” cause of the defendant’s conduct. Instead, the
Ninth Circuit held, a plaintiff must only plead facts plausi-
ly showing that race played “some role” in the defendant’s
decisionmaking process. 743 Fed. Appx. 106, XXXXXXXXXX);
3 Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2020)
Opinion of the Court
see also National Assn. of African American-Owned Media
v. Charter Communications, Inc., 915 F. 3d 617, 626 (CA9
2019) (describing the test as whether “discriminatory intent
play[ed] any role”). And under this more forgiving causa-
tion standard, the court continued, ESN had pleaded a via-
le claim.
Other circuits dispute the Ninth Circuit’s understanding
of §1981. Like the district court in this case, for example,
the Seventh Circuit has held that “to be actionable, racial
prejudice must be a but-for cause . . . of the refusal to trans-
act.” Bachman v. St. Monica’s Congregation, 902 F. 2d
1259, 1262– XXXXXXXXXXTo resolve the disagreement
among the circuits over §1981’s causation requirement, we
agreed to hear this case. 587 U. S. ___ (2019).
II
It is “textbook tort law” that a plaintiff seeking redress
for a defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for
causation. University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center
v. Nassar, 570 U. S. 338, XXXXXXXXXXciting W. Keeton, D.
Do
s, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law
of Torts 265 (5th ed XXXXXXXXXXUnder this standard, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that, but for the defendant’s unlawful
conduct, its alleged injury would not have occu
ed. This
ancient and simple “but for” common law causation test, we
have held, supplies the “default” or “background” rule
against which Congress is normally presumed to have leg-
islated when creating its own new causes of action. 570
U. S., at 346–347 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and
Power v. Manhart, 435 U. S. 702, XXXXXXXXXXThat in-
cludes when it comes to federal antidiscrimination laws like
§1981. See 570 U. S., at 346–347 (Title VII retaliation);
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U. S. 167, 176–
XXXXXXXXXXAge Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967).
Normally, too, the essential elements of a claim remain
4 COMCAST CORP. v. NATIONAL ASSN. OF AFRICAN
AMERICAN-OWNED MEDIA
Opinion of the Court
constant through the life of a lawsuit. What a plaintiff must
do to satisfy those elements may increase as a case pro-
gresses from complaint to trial, but the legal elements
themselves do not change. So, to determine what the plain-
tiff must plausibly allege at the outset of a lawsuit, we usu-
ally ask what the plaintiff must prove in the trial at its end.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 561
(1992); Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U. S.
336, 346– XXXXXXXXXX); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 678–
XXXXXXXXXX).
ESN doesn’t seriously dispute these general principles.
Instead, it suggests §1981 creates an exception to one o
oth of them. At times, ESN seems to argue that a §1981
plaintiff only bears the burden of showing that race was a
“motivating factor” in the defendant’s challenged decision,
not a but-for cause of its injury. At others, ESN appears to
concede that a §1981 plaintiff does have to prove but-fo
causation at trial, but contends the rules should be different
at the pleading stage. According to this version of ESN’s
argument, a plaintiff should be able to overcome at least a
motion to dismiss if it can allege facts plausibly showing
that race was a “motivating factor” in the defendant’s deci-
sion. ESN admits this a
angement would allow some
claims to proceed past the pleading stage that are destined
to fail later as a matter of law. Still, the company insists,
that is what the statute demands.
A
We don’t doubt that most rules bear their exceptions.
But, taken collectively, clues from the