Descartes postulates the existence of aMalicious Demonin the 3rdskeptical challenge of theFirst Meditation.What is the unique purpose of the maliciousdemon in comparison with the other two challenges?
2.In light of the Problem of the Criterion,What is the main purpose of theSecond Meditation?How does Descartes attempt to satisfyChisholm’sthree conditions for a criterion of truth in this meditation?
3.Explain the precise difference between a Cartesianmindand a Cartesianbody, asoutlined in theSecond Meditation.Which term does Descartes believe best characterizes what he is, and how does he arrive at this solution?
Descartes’ Epistemological Project (Meditations I-III) The purpose or goal of the Meditations is to construct a theory of knowledge from the ground up–– which is why Descartes is called a foundationalist about knowledge. Recall that there are two questions looming in the background which demand answers from anyone interested in doing epistemology. We will call this the Problem of the Criterion (Chisholm): (1) What do we know? or What is the extent of our knowledge? (2) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria for knowing? If you are a skeptic, you believe that neither of these questions can be answered independently, that is, without already assuming an answer to the other. The skeptic claims that we cannot know what, if anything, we know, and that there is no possible criteria to help clear up the matter, so the project of epistemology is hopelessly circular! In the First Meditation, Descartes sets out to defeat skepticism by engaging in the skeptical project itself! He poses himself three skeptical challenges: (a) Doubt all general sensory data––Reject the Senses Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once. (DSW 76) (b) Doubt all “specific” and immediate perceptions––The Dream Argument 1. I sometimes have experiences which at the time I take to be true waking experiences but which I later decide were illusory (dreams). 2. Such dreams can be so like my waking experiences that they are, considered in themselves, qualitatively indistinguishable from my waking experiences. 3. If such dreams are qualitatively indistinguishable from my waking experiences, then no experience of mine considered in itself is such that I can with certainty distinguish it as a waking experience from a dream. 4....
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