United States Supreme Court
MINNESOTA v. DICKERSON
(1993)
No XXXXXXXXXX
Argued: March 3, 1993Decided: June 7, 1993
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III and IV, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a concu
ing opinion, post, p. 379. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion concu
ing in part and dissenting in part, in which BLACKMUN and THOMAS, JJ., joined, post, p. 383. [508 U.S. 366, 368]
Michael O. Freeman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the
iefs were Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Patrick C. Diamond, and Beverly J. Wolfe.
Richard H. Seamon argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the
ief were Solicitor General Sta
, Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, and Kathleen A. Felton.
Peter W. Gorman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the
ief William R. Kennedy, David H. Knutson, Wa
en R. Sagstuen, and Renee J. Bergeron. *
[ Footnote * ] Fred E. Inbau, Wayne W. Schmidt, James P. Manak, and Robert H. Macy filed a
ief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., et al. urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by John F. Savarese, Steven R. Shapiro, and Deborah Gilman; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by David M. Eldridge.
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we consider whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective patdown search.
I
On the evening of November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis police officers were patrolling an area on the city's north side in a marked squad car. At about 8:15 p.m., one of the officers
observed respondent leaving a 12-unit apartment building on Morgan Avenue North. The officer, having previously responded to complaints of drug sales in the building's hallways, and having executed several search wa
ants on the premises, considered the building to be a notorious "crack house." According to testimony credited by the trial court, respondent began walking toward the police but, [508 U.S. 366, 369] upon spotting the squad car and making eye contact with one of the officers, a
uptly halted and began walking in the opposite direction. His suspicion aroused, this officer watched as respondent turned and entered an alley on the other side of the apartment building. Based upon respondent's seemingly evasive actions and the fact that he had just left a building known for cocaine traffic, the officers decided to stop respondent and investigate further.
The officers pulled their squad car into the alley and ordered respondent to stop and submit to a patdown search. The search revealed no weapons, but the officer conducting the search did take an interest in a small lump in respondent's nylon jacket. The officer later testified:
"[A]s I pat-searched the front of his body, I felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in cellophane." Tr. 9 (Feb. 20, 1990).
The officer then reached into respondent's pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag containing one fifth of one gram of crack cocaine. Respondent was a
ested and charged
in Hennepin County District Court with possession of a controlled substance.
Before trial, respondent moved to suppress the cocaine. The trial court first concluded that the officers were justified under Te
y v. Ohio, 392 U.S XXXXXXXXXX), in stopping respondent to investigate whether he might be engaged in criminal activity. The court further found that the officers were justified in frisking respondent to ensure that he was not ca
ying a weapon. Finally, analogizing to the "plain view" doctrine, under which officers may make a wa
antless seizure of contraband found in plain view during a lawful search for other items, the trial court ruled that the officers' seizure of the cocaine did not violate the Fourth Amendment:
"To this Court, there is no distinction as to which sensory perception the officer uses to conclude that the[508 U.S. 366, 370] material is contraband. An experienced officer may rely upon his sense of smell in DWI stops or in recognizing the smell of burning marijuana in an automobile. The sound of a shotgun being racked would clearly support certain reactions by an officer. The sense of touch, grounded in experience and training, is as reliable as perceptions drawn from other senses. `Plain feel,' therefore, is no different than plain view, and will equally support the seizure here." App. to Pet. for Cert. C 5.
His suppression motion having failed, respondent proceeded to trial and was found
guilty.
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed. The court agreed with the trial court that the investigative stop and protective patdown search of respondent were lawful under Te
y because the officers had a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that respondent was engaged in criminal behavior and that he might be armed and dangerous. The court concluded, however, that the officers had overstepped the bounds allowed by Te
y in seizing the cocaine. In doing so, the Court of Appeals "decline[d] to adopt the plain feel exception" to the wa
ant requirement. 469 N.W.2d 462, XXXXXXXXXX).
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. Like the Court of Appeals, the State Supreme Court held that both the stop and the frisk of respondent were valid under Te
y, but found the seizure of the cocaine to be unconstitutional. The court expressly refused "to extend the plain view doctrine to the sense of touch" on the grounds that "the sense of touch is inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight," and that "the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the personal privacy that is at the core of the [F]ourth [A]mendment." 481 N.W.2d 840, XXXXXXXXXXThe court thus appeared to adopt a categorical rule ba
ing the seizure of any contraband detected by an officer through the sense of touch during a patdown search for weapons. The court further noted that, "[e]ven if we recognized a [508 U.S. 366, 371] `plain feel' exception, the search in this case would not qualify" because "[t]he pat search of the defendant went far beyond what is permissible under Te
y." Id., at 843, 844, n. 1. As the State Supreme Court read the record, the officer conducting the search ascertained that the lump in respondent's jacket was contraband only after probing and investigating what he certainly knew was not a weapon. See id., at 844.
We granted certiorari, 506 U.S XXXXXXXXXX), to resolve a conflict among the state and federal courts over whether contraband detected through the sense of touch during a patdown search may be admitted into evidence. 1 We now affirm. 2 [508 U.S. 366, 372]
II
A
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S XXXXXXXXXX), guarantees "[t]he right Of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, XXXXXXXXXXper curiam) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, XXXXXXXXXXfootnotes omitted)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, XXXXXXXXXX); see also United State v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, XXXXXXXXXXOne such exception was [508 U.S. 366, 373] recognized in Te
y v. Ohio, 392 U.S XXXXXXXXXX), which held that, "where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot. . .," the officer may
iefly stop the suspicious person and make "reasonable inquiries" aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Id., at 30; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, XXXXXXXXXX).
Te
y further held that, "[w]hen an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others," the officer may conduct a patdown search "to determine whether the person is in fact ca
ying a weapon." 392 U.S., at 24 . "The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence. . . ." Adams, supra, at 146. Rather, a protective search - permitted without a wa
ant and on the basis of reasonable suspicion less than probable cause - must be strictly "limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nea
y." Te
y, supra, at 26; see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 , and 1052, n XXXXXXXXXX); Yba
a v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, XXXXXXXXXXIf the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Te
y. and its fruits will be suppressed. Si
on v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, XXXXXXXXXX).
These principles were settled 25 years ago when, on the same day, the Court announced its decisions in Te
y and Si
on. The question presented today is whether police officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Te
y. We think the answer is clearly that they may, so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Te
y. [508 U.S. 366, 374]
B
We have already