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Page 1 of 11 National Transportation Safety Board Aviation Accident Final Report Location: Yellow Pine, Idaho Accident Number: WPR14FA094 Date & Time: December 1, 2013, 13:03 Local Registration: N36ML...

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Page 1 of 11
National Transportation Safety Board
Aviation Accident Final Report
Location: Yellow Pine, Idaho Accident Number: WPR14FA094
Date & Time: December 1, 2013, 13:03 Local Registration: N36ML
Aircraft: Beech B36TC Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
Defining Event: Fuel related Injuries: 5 Fatal
Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
Analysis
The instrument-rated pilot was on a 234-nm instrument flight rules (IFR) cross-country flight over
mountainous te
ain; instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time. During the flight, the
pilot notified a controller at the Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) that the airplane was picking
up too much ice and requested to divert to an airport located about 96 miles ahead of his position and to
descend to 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl). The controller informed the pilot that he could descend to
12,000 feet msl for te
ain clearance. Over the following few minutes, the ARTCC controller notified
the pilot several times that he had to maintain an altitude of 12,000 feet or above due to te
ain
clearance, all of which the pilot acknowledged. Following a low-altitude alert issued by the controller,
the pilot stated his altitude was 11,500 feet. Subsequently, the pilot advised the controller that he was
having engine problems and needed to go to an airport immediately.
When the controller asked the pilot to verify his altitude, the pilot responded that he was at 10,000 feet.
The controller then asked the pilot if he was able to climb, and the pilot responded "negative." The
controller advised the pilot of an airport that was 24 miles behind his position and asked if he wanted to
divert. The pilot responded affirmatively and asked for guidance to the airport. About 1 minute later, the
pilot advised the controller that the airplane had "just lost its engine." The controller advised the pilot
that the airport was at the pilot's six o'clock position and suggested a heading of 253 degrees, adding that
another airport was right below their position. There were no further communications with the accident
airplane.
Wreckage and impact signatures were found consistent with a wings-level, slightly nose-low descent
into trees and te
ain. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of any
preexisting mechanical malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.
Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMETs) for IFR and mountain obscuration conditions, low-
level wind shear and tu
ulence, and moderate icing were issued for the flight track area and timeframe.
In additional to the AIRMETs, multiple pilot reports included reports of light rime-type icing between
8,000 feet and 13,000 feet throughout the region and National Weather Service data was consistent with
the pilot reports and AIRMET that were cu
ent at the time. The investigation was unable to determine
Page 2 of 11 WPR14FA094
whether the pilot obtained weather information regarding his planned flight. It is likely that the loss of
engine power was due to a combination of structural and induction icing during the continued flight in
icing conditions in an airplane that was not certified for flight in icing conditions.
Probable Cause and Findings
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be:
The pilot's continued flight into known light-to-moderate icing conditions over mountainous te
ain.
Contributing to the accident was the loss of engine power due to induction icing.
Findings
Personnel issues Decision making/judgment - Pilot
Personnel issues Use of equip/system - Pilot
Environmental issues Conducive to structural icing - Effect on equipment
Aircraft Air intake - Not specified
Page 3 of 11 WPR14FA094
Factual Information
History of Flight
Enroute-cruise Structural icing
Enroute-cruise Altitude deviation
Enroute-cruise Fuel related (Defining event)
Enroute-cruise Loss of engine power (partial)
Enroute-cruise Controlled flight into te
obj (CFIT)
On December 1, 2013, about 1303 mountain standard time, a Beech B36TC, N36ML, was destroyed
when it impacted te
ain while maneuvering near Yellow Pine, Idaho. The airplane was registered to and
operated by the pilot under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The
instrument rated private pilot and his four passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological
conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the personal flight. The
234 nautical mile cross-country flight originated from Baker City Municipal Airport (BKE) Baker City,
Oregon, about 1222 with an intended destination of Butte, Montana.
Information provided from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that the flight departed
from BKE under visual flight rules. At 1226, when the aircraft was about 10 miles south of BKE at an
altitude of about 6,200 feet, the pilot contacted the FAA Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC)
equesting to activate an IFR flight plan to Butte, Montana. At 1230, the controller issued the accident
airplane the BKE altimeter and identified the airplane was located about 13 miles south of the BKE
VOR. The controller then cleared the flight to Butte as filed and directed the pilot to climb and maintain
13,000 feet. The pilot acknowledged the clearance and altitude. The controller followed with a clearance
for the flight to proceed direct to the Donnelly VOR.
At 1240, the controller advised the pilot that the McCall Municipal Airport (MYL), McCall, Idaho,
altimeter setting was XXXXXXXXXXThe pilot acknowledged about one minute and six seconds later. At 1256,
the controller asked the pilot to confirm he was level at 13,000 and established on victor airway 121.
The pilot responded with "negative, three six mike lima's picking up too much ice uh we'd like to divert
to uh Salmon." Shortly after, the pilot requested to descend to 11,000 feet. The controller advised the
pilot to maintain 12,000 feet for te
ain clearance. The pilot acknowledged 12,000 feet.
At 1257, the controller then asked the pilot if he would like to divert and the pilot subsequently verified
that he would like to divert to Salmon. The controller cleared the pilot to Salmon via direct to the
Salmon VOR and again instructed the pilot to maintain 12,000 for te
ain clearance. The pilot
acknowledged with "maintain one two thousand six mike lima."
At 1300, the controller asked the pilot to confirm he was still on victor airway 121 and the pilot
esponded with "establishing victor 121." The controller directed the pilot to turn right 15 degrees to be
established on the airway. The pilot acknowledged. The controller then issued the pilot a low altitude
alert, instructing him to check his altitude immediately. The controller stated that the minimum IFR
altitude was 11,900 and instructed the pilot to climb and maintain 12,000 feet immediately. When asked
Page 4 of 11 WPR14FA094
to say altitude, the pilot advised that he was at 11,500 and climbing. The controller reiterated to the pilot
that they had to maintain 12,000 feet for te
ain.
At 1301:04, the pilot advised the controller that he was having engine problems and 15 seconds later
advised that he needed to "go to three uniform two immediately." The controller asked the pilot to verify
his altitude, which the pilot responded he was at 10,000 feet. The controller then asked the pilot if he
was able to climb, and the pilot responded "negative." The controller advised the pilot that MYL was 24
miles behind him and asked if he wanted to divert. The pilot responded affirmatively and asked for
guidance. The controller suggested a heading of 253 degrees and reminded the pilot that the minimum
IFR altitude was 11,900.
At 1302, the pilot reported that "36ML just lost its engine" and asked the controller to "say again
heading for six mike lima." The controller advised that MYL was at the pilot's six o'clock position and
suggested a heading of 253 degrees, adding that 3U2 was right below their position. The controller
stated that he had information for the airport and asked the pilot if he'd like that information. There was
an unintelligible response that could not be associated with any specific aircraft. The controller
attempted to relay communications via other aircraft in the area and
oadcast 3U2 airport information
to N36ML in the blind. There were no further communications with N36ML.
The FAA subsequently issued an Alert Notification (ALNOT) at 1328. The United States Air Force
Rescue Coordination Center (ARCC), Civil Air Patrol, local law enforcement, Idaho Air National
Guard, Idaho Department of Aeronautics, and volunteers commenced search and rescue operations
throughout the area where radar contact was lost. There were no reported ELT signals within the area of
the last radar target.
The wreckage was located in snow covered wooded mountainous te
ain on January 10, 2014 by a
ground search team about 1.5 miles east of the last recorded radar target.
Pilot Information
Certificate: Private Age: 51
Airplane Rating(s): Single-engine land Seat Occupied: Unknown
Other Aircraft Rating(s): None Restraint Used: Unknown
Instrument Rating(s): Airplane Second Pilot Present: No
Instructor Rating(s): None Toxicology Performed: Yes
Medical Certification: Class 2 With waivers/limitations Last FAA Medical Exam: March 27, 2013
Occupational Pilot: No Last Flight Review or Equivalent:
Flight Time: (Estimated) 1050 hours (Total, all aircraft)
The pilot, age 51, held a private pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land and
instrument airplane ratings. A second-class airman medical certificate was issued to the pilot
on March 27, 2013, with the limitation stated "must wear co
ective lenses." The
pilot reported that he had accumulated a total of 1,050 total flight hours at the time of his most
ecent medical application. The pilot's logbook was not located.
Page 5 of 11 WPR14FA094
Aircraft and Owne
Operator Information
Aircraft Make: Beech Registration: N36ML
Model/Series: B36TC TC Aircraft Category: Airplane
Year of Manufacture: 1983 Amateur Built: No
Airworthiness Certificate: Normal Serial Number: EA-375
Landing Gear Type: Retractable - Tricycle Seats: 6
Date/Type of Last Inspection: June 3, 2013 Annual Certified Max Gross Wt.:
Time Since Last Inspection: Engines: 1 Reciprocating
Airframe Total Time: 1612 Hrs as of last inspection Engine Manufacturer: Continental Motors
ELT: Installed, not activated Engine Model/Series: TSIO-520-UB3F
Registered Owner: Rated Power: 300 Horsepowe
Operator: On file Operating Certificate(s)
Held:
None
The six-seat, low-wing, retractable-gear airplane, serial number (S/N) EA-375, was manufactured in
1983. It was powered by a Continental Motors TSIO-520-UB3F, serial number 527486, rated at 300
horsepower. The airplane was also equipped with a McCauley 3A32C406-C adjustable pitch propeller.
Review of partial copies of the aircraft logbooks revealed that the most recent annual inspection was
completed on June 3, 2013, at a tach time of 1,611.85 hours. The engine was overhauled on March 19,
2010, and subsequently installed on the airframe on April 1, 2010, at a tach time of
Answered Same Day Feb 09, 2022

Solution

Bidusha answered on Feb 10 2022
115 Votes
Yellow Pine ID Accident Report        4
YELLOW PINE ID ACCIDENT REPORT
Analysis Report
The fatal occu
ence of the N36ML aircraft appeared to have a times of dangerous minutes that were demonstrated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) last accident analysis report. With the pilot in command was instrument appraised with a collected 1050 hours of flight from the hour of his latest clinical assessment, there were a few undertakings and duties a pilot ought to have the option to execute to proficiently fly with as negligible risks as conceivable, for example, pre-flight checks and motor and parts investigations, getting themselves acquainted with the aircrafts motors framework execution and its suitable documents like emergency systems, and particularly taking notes from the functioning information on the single pilot resource management (SRM's).
Assuming the pilot were to execute any of these fundamental e
ands and prerequisites during his flight from all the pre-flight reviews and climate
iefings, having information and perceptions of the attributes of his plane and used his SRM preparing, he might have straightforwardly forestalled the sad result that came about with the chance divert towards an alternative airport nea
y. A lacking preflight investigation can
ing about bothersome outcomes that comes from inadequate preparation, and carelessness. In the conditions of the Beechcraft, the pilot is committed under 14 CFR §91.103 (a) to be comfortable with all suitable data concerning the flight: the data ought to incorporate flights under IFR or a flight not nea
y the airport, climate forecasts and fuel necessities, alternatives accessible in the event that the flight cannot be achieved, and any known climate (icing) traffic defe
als of which the pilot in command has been prompted by ATC.
As indicated by the analysis report, the pilot signed in to the Direct Users Access Terminal System (DUATS) and started an IFR flight plan at 1200 on the obligation day of the flight. Despite the fact that DUATS was applied, no proper climate preparation was even mentioned nor was it clear assuming he utilized alternative sources preceding the flight. Actually, he had spent numerous hours in the Beechcraft he had flown, the pilot was well in his ability to plan constantly to stay away from the disastrous occasion.
Assuming a legitimate climate preparation were directed, it would have been difficult to disregard the past reports of flight to direct rime icing conditions under 18,000 feet before...
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