MARI 6050: Major assignment
For the major assignment you must answer two topics.
Assignment topic 1 is mandatory.
For the second assignment topic you have a choice between topic 2,3, or 4.
Assignment topic #1 (mandatory): Drift to Danger XXXXXXXXXXmarks
In the required reading in Unit 2b, Nancy Leveson refers to the “migration toward states
of higher risk” in her testimony before the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources. Pioneering safety researcher Jens Rasmussen identified a similar
phenomenon which he called “drift to danger”. ‘Safety drift’ is another term used to
describe this phenomenon.
a) What do Leveson and Rasmussen mean by “migration toward states of higher risk”
and “drift to danger” and what is the significant of this phenomenon to the HSEQ
manager / DPA?
) What are the signals of ‘safety drift’ and how can the HSEQ manager / DPA guard
against and counteract the “migration toward states of higher risk”?
Word count XXXXXXXXXXwords
and your choice of one of the following topics
Assignment topic #2: Communication founded on Mutual Trust 50 marks
The ISM code and the ISO management standards each refer to ‘communication’ yet
provide little guidance on how to achieve effective communication. According to ISO
45001:2018, “[A culture that supports an organization’s OH&S management system] is
characterized by, but not limited to, active participation of workers, cooperation and
communications founded on mutual trust, [and] shared perceptions of the
importance of the OH&S management system...”
a) Explain what ‘communication founded on mutual trust’ means and why it is a
fundamental condition for an effective Safety Management System.
) What measures can organizational leaders take to achieve effective 'communication
founded on mutual trust’ and to ensure ‘shared perceptions of the importance of the
OH&S management system'?
Word count XXXXXXXXXXwords
OR
Assignment topic #3: Integrated (Safety) Management Systems 50 marks
Annex L (formerly Annex XL) has made it easier for companies to combine the
equirements of the ISM Code and ISO management systems (such as ISO 9001,
14001, 50001 and XXXXXXXXXXinto one integrated (safety) management system (IMS).
a) What is an ‘integrated management system’ and describe the benefits and potential
drawbacks of an IMS.
) Comment (from a maritime shipping perspective) on the following extract from the
article, Integrated Management Systems – three different levels of integration,
written by Jørgensen, Remme and Mellado (2006).
“...compatibility is only a small step towards an integrated management system…
An even more ambitious level of integration is concerned with creating a
culture of learning, stakeholder participation and continuous improvement of
performance…”
Word count: XXXXXXXXXXwords
OR
Assignment topic #4: DPA – Influence and Responsibilities 50 marks
MSC-MEPC.7/Circ.8 states ;
A key role, as identified by the ISM Code, in the effective implementation
of a safety management system is that of the Designated Person. This is
the person based ashore whose influence and responsibilities
should significantly affect the development and implementation of a
safety culture within the Company.
a) Comment on the sentence in bold and explain how the DPA’s influence and
esponsibilities can significantly affect the development and implementation of a
positive safety culture within the company
.) ISM Code Clause 4 states, “The responsibility and authority of the designated
person or persons should include …ensuring that adequate resources and shore-
ased support are applied.” Why is this important and what actions can the DPA
take to achieve this?
Word count: XXXXXXXXXXwords
• Ensure you reference all your resources using APA format.
• Submit your paper electronically in WORD format in the D2L dropbox.
• Use Arial or Times New Roman Font 12 double line spacing
• When referencing your paper cite only those sources which you used in your report
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Unit 2B: Maritime Safety Culture
Unit 2B: Maritime Safety Management
Overview
Seafarer safety culture is difficult to measure. Before metrics are utilized the Designated Person
Ashore (DPA) must establish that the basics of safety management are in place both ashore and
on-board.
Introduction
The International Safety Management (ISM) Code states that one of its key objectives is to
establish a ‘safety culture’ in shipping companies;
The application of the ISM Code should support and encourage the development of a
safety culture in shipping. Success factors for the development of a culture that promotes
safety and environmental protection are, inter alia, commitment, values, beliefs and clarity of
the safety management system. (ISM Code 1.1.4)
However, the ISM Code does not actually define the meaning of the term. According to the
International Chamber of Shipping;
"A safety culture may be described as the values and practices that management and
personnel share to ensure that risks are always minimized and mitigated to the greatest
degree possible."
"In an effective safety culture, everyone employed by the company, whether a manager,
Master or a junior rating, truly believes in and understands the purpose of established
procedures, and will think about safety, and the means of improving it, as a matter of
course."
Safety Culture and Risk
In her book, Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management, Dr. Aleka Mandaraka-Sheppard
wrote;
Safety Culture means that the management of a company adopts the appropriate attitude
and values towards safety and ensures commitment to safety by all in the company. A
company with a good safety culture aims for transparency of management and operational
practices, and the minimization of all possible risks that are due to the human element.
Regular audits, risk assessment and evaluation, as well as implementation of plans to
control risk exposure, should enhance the safety culture and lead to a company almost free
from risk incidents. But, in the real world, there are factors of safety that are not within the
control of the ship owning or managing companies. (Mandaraka-Sheppard, p. 1020)
Note the author mentioned ‘almost free from risk incidents’. S. Raymond, in his paper ‘The
Apparent Cyclical Nature Of Marine Insurance And Its Affect On Risk Assessment And
Management’ wrote, “Because of the nature of the business in which we operate, accidents and
losses will continue to happen in the most safety conscious environments. But we all have a
collective responsibility to work together in order to ensure that these losses are reduced to the
lowest possible level.”
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From the MAIB Incident report
This philosophy of collective responsibility is enshrined in the ISM code which provides for each
company to;
i. Adopt a philosophy of safety culture at all levels; in other words, to commit to a mission fo
safety, to cultivate the right attitude and motivate its employees;
ii. Provide for safe practices by putting procedures in place and recording incidents; ensuring
competence and training of the crew and ca
ying out equipment maintenance within the
time required, or recommended;
iii. Strive for continuous improvement by monitoring, auditing, evaluating faults and preventing
their re-occu
ence; and
iv. Prevent accidents and protect the environment, paying particular attention to the human
element and man-equipment interface in accidents
Mandaraka-Sheppard argues that 'safety culture' is ultimately determined by top management –
the ‘mind and will’ of the organization.
People employed at the top, who are the ‘mind and will’ of the organization determine the
safety culture and the risk tolerance of the company. The staff employed in the technical
operations, or in the shore management or in the navigation of ships, are performing the
core business of the company. Proper and clear communication channels between
themselves and their superiors are essential for the avoidance of accidents and losses.
Without clear communication and training, which have become even more essential fo
compliance with the ISM Code and the Standard of Training Certification and Watchkeeping
Convention (STCW), the company is at risk.
Safety Culture: Risk Creep
There are several examples of car ca
iers developing excessive lists or capsizing due to
improper cargo loading, stability calculations, or ballasting operations. The most recent example
is the Golden Ray which capsized off the Georgia coast September 8, 2019. In the investigation
of a previous incident - the car fe
y Hoegh Osaka in XXXXXXXXXXthe UKs Maritime Accident
Investigation Bureau (MAIB) stated;
Witness and anecdotal evidence suggest that the practice of not calculating the actual
stability condition on completion of cargo operations extends to the PCC/PCTC [Pure
Car Ca
ier / Pure Car Truck Ca
ier] sector in general. For reasons of efficiency, what
is a fundamental principle of seamanship appears to have been allowed to drift,
giving rise to potential unsafe practices. [2.7.2]
While the investigation
acknowledged that the
Chief Officer failed to
fulfill is obligation to
properly calculate the
stability condition of the
vessel after loading, it
also highlighted the
systemic ‘safety culture’
issues which allowed fo
the human e
or to
occur. A lack of prope
familiarization training
and a failure of
oversight by the
company and Maste
were two systemic
safety issues identified
in the report.
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Any organization is subject to ‘safety drift’ (or ‘risk creep’). It is the insidious and unrecognized
increase in risk that occurs despite our belief that we our acting in a safe manner. It is also
efe
ed to as a ‘normalization of deviance’.
In his article, The Frog On The Stove: Risk Creep, Kevin Wilson wrote; “The Deepwater Horizon
explosion is an example of the ‘normalization of deviance,’ in which smart people slide into
danger without realizing it; then perhaps an illusion of safety permits the gradual loosening of
standards, and this [loosening of standards] is perceived psychologically as an acceptable risk.
Risk creep guarantees that eventually an incident or accident will happen. In the case of the
Deepwater Horizon risk creep resulted in a human and environmental catastrophe.
According to an Allianz report “Despite huge improvements in maritime safety, fatal accidents at
sea persist. Human e
or continues to be a major driver of incidents and Captains and crews are
under increasing commercial pressure as supply chains are streamlined. Tight schedules can
have a detrimental effect on safety culture and decision-making leading to the “normalization of
isk”.
Michael Simms, Moore Stephens partner, Shipping Industry Group, says:
“Shipping is a high-risk industry, and one where inattention to the proper identification and
management of risk can have catastrophic consequences. It is not possible to take the risk
out of shipping.