Homework Assignment 1 Homework Assignment 1 Lewis Luartz POSC 130: Introduction to...

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Homework Assignment 1

Homework Assignment 1

Lewis Luartz POSC 130: Introduction to Comparative Politics Fe
uary 11, 2020

Due Date: 1:00 PM on Tuesday, Fe
uary 25, 2020 in class or online via Blackboard.

Reminder: Late submissions will be penalized as follows:

    One and one-half (1 1/2) letter grade for every twenty-four (24) hours it is late, up to a maximum of forty-eight (48) hours.
    After forty-eight (48) hours, the student will receive a grade of zero (0) for the assign- ment.

    Instructions: Answer each of the following problems completely. Give the best answer for each.
    Solve the following problems from Chapter 2 of CGG.
    Problem 3 (10 pts)
    Problem 9 (10 pts)
    Problem XXXXXXXXXXpts)
    Problem XXXXXXXXXXpts)
    Solve the following problems from Chapter 3 of CGG.
    Problem 2 (10 pts)
    Problem 4 (10 pts)
    Consider the extensive form game below. [Total Point Possible: 15 pts]
    What are the strategies of each of the three players? (5 pts)
    What are the subgame perfect equili
ia of the game? (10 pts)

    [Total Point Possible: 40 pts]

    [Total Point Possible: 20 pts]
    1

H P3(3, 4, XXXXXXXXXX, 3, 3) (1, 2, (6, 1, 1) P2 I C D E A G P2 B P1 F

(6, 0, 1)

(2, 2, 2)

    Consider the extensive form game below. [Total Point Possible: 10 pts]
    What are the subgame perfect equili
ia of the game? (10 pts)

H P3(3, 4, XXXXXXXXXX, 3, 3) (1, 2, (6, 2, 1) P2 I C D E A G P2 B P1 F

(6, 0, 1)

(2, 3, 2)

    Consider the extensive form game below. [Total Point Possible: 15 pts]
    What are the strategies of each of the three players? (5 pts)
    What are the subgame perfect equili
ia of the game? (10 pts)

H P3(1, 4, XXXXXXXXXX, 9, 3) (1, 3, (6, 2, 1) P2 I C D E A G P2 B P1 F

(6, 6, 1)

(3, 3, 2)

homework-1-supplement-2-gykedden.html homework-1-jhgner5d.html

Rajeswari · Accepted Answer

Chapter 3
Staton’s preference ordering
Stay out, don’t advertise –4
Stay out advertise –3
Enter, don’t advertise 2
Enter advertise 1
The Payoff of Station, Reenock are given at the end in brackets in the same order.
Strategy of Station would be to get 4 hence he would opt do not advertise.
But if Reenock selects enter, he would drop to 3.
From Reenock point of view he would try to get max 2.
So he would try to select stay out.
Thus Perfect equilibrium at (4,2) where no player wants to change.
Bottom part is the perfect equilibrium.
If not reversed pay back of Station, Reenock are (1,1) (3,1) (2,2) (4,2)
Thus except the top and the bottom  the other two values are interchanged.
c)Hence order matters here not for perfect equilibrium but other cases.
.
Question no.4
Get raise, vote no > Get raise, vote yes > No raise, vote no > No raise, vote yes.
b) to solve by backward induction
If no raise each would vote for no. But no raise has pay offs low as (2,1,2) or (2,2,1) or (2,2,2) or (1,2,2) compared to raise
(3,3,3) (3,3,4) or (3,4,3)or (4,3,3)
i.e. any person pay off is highest if he votes no but gets raise
worst when he votes yes but no rise.
If no raise is the result,

Homework Assignment 1 Homework Assignment 1 Lewis Luartz POSC 130: Introduction to Comparative Politics February 11, 2020 Due Date: 1:00 PM on Tuesday, February 25, 2020 in class or online via...

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