Amsterdam University Press
Chapter Title: On the Ottoman janissaries (fourteenth-nineteenth centuries)
Chapter Author(s): Gilles Veinstein
Book Title: Fighting for a Living
Book Subtitle: A Comparative Study of Military Labour XXXXXXXXXX
Book Editor(s): Erik-Jan Zürche
Published by: Amsterdam University Press. (2013)
Stable URL: https:
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt6wp6pg.7
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
ange of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact XXXXXXXXXX.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https:
about.jstor.org/terms
This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). To view a copy of this license,
visit https:
creativecommons.org/licenses
y-nc-nd/4.0/. Funding is provided by
Knowledge Unlatched Pilot.
Amsterdam University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Fighting for a Living
This content downloaded from XXXXXXXXXXon Mon, 27 Jan XXXXXXXXXX:32:48 UTC
All use subject to https:
about.jstor.org/terms
On the Ottoman janissaries
(fourteenth-nineteenth centuries)
Gilles Veinstein
The janissaries are probably one of the most famous military corps in world
history. Nevertheless, they were only a part of the Ottoman army and not
even the most numerous one. At any period in the Ottoman history, they
coexisted with a series of other military units, some of them created earlier
(hence the name of yeni çeri, meaning “new troops”), others emerging in
later times. All of these corps were of different natures as regards their
modes of recruitment, the status of their members, their specif ic role in
war, their method of remuneration, and so on. I shall concentrate on the
corps (ocak) of the janissaries.1 Over several centuries, they were both a
cause of te
or and a source of admiration for the West, but they were also
a danger for the Ottoman rulers themselves, due to their tendency to rebel.
Beyond these stereotypes, one has to keep in mind that they did not offer
only one face during all their long history. On the contrary, they were in a
process of constant change, especially as far as their recruitment sources
and military value were concerned.
Origins
The janissaries were established in the second half of the fourteenth cen-
tury, probably under the reign of Sultan Murad I (there is some discussion
on this point as well as on the origins of the corps in general, which remain
somewhat obscure).2
1 General works on this corps include: Weissman, Les janissaires; Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti
teşkilâtından kapu kulu ocakları; Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, XXXXXXXXXX, pp. 43-49, “Yeni çeri”;
Veinstein, “Le janissaire et l’islamologue”. Among the main sources that I shall refer to, I would
also like to mention Petrosian, Mebde-i kanun-i yeniçeri ocagı tarihi; Petrosian gives the Russian
translation and the facsimile of the manuscript of St Petersburg, cited below as Kavânîn; for the
Turkish edition of another copy of this work, see Akgündüz, “Kavânîn-i yeniçeriyân-i dergâh-i
âli”. On this work, see Fodor, “Bir Nasihatname olarak ‘kavanin-i yeniçeriyan’”.
2 Palmer, “The Origin of the Janissary”; Papoulia, Ursprung und Wesen der Knabenlese im
osmanischen Reich, pp. 74ff. (reviewed by I. Beldiceanu-Steinhe
in Revue des études islamiques,
36, XXXXXXXXXX), pp. 172-176); Beldiceanu-Steinhe
, “La conquête d’Andrinople par les turcs”; Kaldy-
Nagy, “The First Centuries of the Ottoman Military Organization”.
This content downloaded from XXXXXXXXXXon Mon, 27 Jan XXXXXXXXXX:32:48 UTC
All use subject to https:
about.jstor.org/terms
116 GiLLEs vEinstEin
From the beginning, the janissary corps was an infantry unit and a standing
army (which not all the infantry components of the Ottoman army were).
Furthermore, its members were not free men. They were slaves, even if of
a particular kind: they were slaves of the sultan (kapı kulu, hünkâr kulu). I
shall return to the origins of these slaves. Initially, they were not allowed
to get ma
ied.3 Later, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, this ban
would be abolished by Sultan Selim I. From then on, there would be two
kinds of janissaries, ma
ied ones and bachelors. Only the latter would
continue to live in the rooms (oda) of the ba
acks. There is no doubt that
this change was of great consequence for the nature of this army. In any
case, it remained common for the janissaries to be attracted to young boys
and, more particularly, according to certain sources to young Jewish boys.4
Of course, it is always better not to generalize in such matters.
Evolution
If we try to define their military role more precisely, we must underline the
fact that it evolved signif icantly over time. The janissaries were not, at the
eginning, the most eff icient part of the army nor the true instrument of
the Ottoman conquest that they would become later on. Initially, they were
mostly imperial bodyguards who aimed to protect the sovereign and to give
a public image of his power and wealth during ceremonies, very much in the
ancient tradition of the slave guards of the Muslim princes.5 The janissaries
never lost this part of their duties. Testimonies from different periods are
available showing that they made a strong impression on ambassadors and
other foreign visitors with their splendid,
ightly coloured uniforms and
their perfect discipline when they entered the second yard of the Topkapı
Palace for off icial receptions.6
They continued to be bound by a close personal tie to the sultan, under
whose direct patronage they always remained. One small manuscript in
the Vienna Li
ary is interesting in painting a vivid picture of the close
elationship between the sultan, in this case Suleyman the Magnif icent,
and his janissaries: on the janissaries’ side, they hold the deepest reverence
which did not prevent them from making repeated and excessive f inancial
3 According to a prove
, a ma
ied man is not a kul for the sultan: Kavânîn, fol. 10v.
4 See, for instance, Capsali, Seder Elyahu Zuta, I, p. 82.
5 Bosworth, “Ghulâm”, parts I, “The Caliphate” and II, “Persia”.
6 See, among many examples, Fresne-Canaye, Le voyage du Levant, p. 62.
This content downloaded from XXXXXXXXXXon Mon, 27 Jan XXXXXXXXXX:32:48 UTC
All use subject to https:
about.jstor.org/terms
on thE ot toMan JanissariEs (FourtEEnth-ninEtEEnth cEnturiEs) 117
demands; on the sultan’s side, there is an authority which, under certain
circumstances, may become unyielding, but which also gives rise, at other
times, to a smiling humour, almost friendly, and even at times indulging
in jokes.7
The importance of the janissaries in the military f ield would increase
dramatically, in connection with two factors: f irst, they became a decisive
tool in siege warfare, thanks to their specif ic ability to act as a monolithic
and compact block in the f inal assault. The second and probably even
more decisive factor was, following the example of the Balkan armies,
the progressive adoption of f irearms, more precisely the musket (tüfeng),
instead of traditional weapons, in particular bows and a
ows, starting
from the beginning of the f ifteenth century. In the Ottoman rulers’ mind,
the use of this new and revolutionary weapon was intended to remain the
monopoly of the janissaries, in connection – one can imagine – with their
status as a standing army under the direct supervision of the sovereign,
which gave better opportunities for both training and control. An instruc-
tor in chief (ta’limhânecibaşı) was appointed by the sultan. In fact this
monopoly quickly became obsolete, and f irearms circulated among much
larger sections of the population, partly because of qua
els between the
various members of the Ottoman dynasty.8
The number of janissaries equipped with firearms (tüfenkli, tüfenk-endâz)
egan to increase under the reign of Mehmed II, and this continued under
the subsequent reigns. As for the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent, it is not
clear whether the tüfenk-endâz were more numerous or even whether the
use of tüfenk was generalized among the janissaries. The same sultan was
also famous for having expanded the state arms factories. In any case, the
adoption of f irearms was the Ottoman response to the military evolution
of its enemies, especially the Habsburg troops, who proved to be te
ibly
eff icient with their excellent guns made in Germany.
We have no details on the process of the adoption of f irearms and we
know nothing about the reception of this innovation by the troops, who
had already demonstrated their corporatist mind as well as their propensity
to mutiny.9 It remains striking in this respect that, as late as the year 1551,
Suleyman considered it necessary to request the aga, the head of the janis-
7 Vienna, Öste
eichische Nationalbibliothek, Turkish Manuscripts, no. 1815, Kânûnâme-i
Sultân Süleymân (Flügel, III, p. 250) [henceforth, Kânûnnâme].
8 Turan, Sehzâde Bayezid Vak‘ası, pp. 83-96; İnalcık, “The Socio-Political Effects of the Dif-
fusion of Fire-Arms in the Middle East”.
9 We cannot consider the success of this change of arms as obvious if we bear in mind what
the Habsburg ambassador, Busbecq, wrote about the failure of the vizier Rustem Pasha when
This content downloaded from XXXXXXXXXXon Mon, 27 Jan XXXXXXXXXX:32:48 UTC
All use subject to https:
about.jstor.org/terms
118 GiLLEs vEinstEin
saries, to train his men, so that – the sultan says – “they will become experts
in the use of the musket”.10 Equally striking is the fact that the sultan is said
to have been anxious, at each of his visits to the ba
acks of the janissaries,
to see all the off icers shooting, according to their hierarchical order, in the
training area, luxuriously laid out by the same sultan.11 In this context, the
act of shooting appears both as a game and as a kind of rite, expressing the
close relationship between the sultan and his slaves.
At this stage of their evolution, the janissaries were no longer only the
personal escort of the sultan. They also became the main factor in the
Ottomans’ military superiority. They took part in all the main campaigns,
oth on land and at sea, even