The Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute: Development Strategy
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R E V : D E C E M B E R 6 , XXXXXXXXXX
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management.
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V . K A S T U R I R A N G A N
M A R I E B E L L
The Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute:
Development Strategy
Susan Paresky, Chief Development Officer for the Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute (Dana-Fa
er),
paused for a moment to scan the skyline su
ounding Boston’s Longwood Medical area. Paresky had
come to the Institute almost two years earlier in April 1997, a
iving at the close of a successful capital
fund drive that had raised over $100 million. In addition to the capital campaign, the Institute had
aised $35 million for its annual fund through its two major fundraising arms: one under the Dana-
Fa
er Cancer Institute name and the other under the Jimmy Fund um
ella. Notwithstanding this
fundraising success, the pace at the Development Office remained hectic. The Institute’s development
needs were limitless, and whatever funds Paresky could raise, Dana-Fa
er CEO and President
David Nathan could put to good use. Nathan reflected on his ambitions for Dana-Fa
er,
Dana-Fa
er is a living laboratory focused on eradicating cancer. We provide the best
possible patient care today and do the research needed to provide even better care for
tomo
ow. Such an environment does not come without a price. We are constantly in need of
money for new space, infrastructure, and training. Patient fees and government research
grants only cover about 80% of our ongoing costs, so we look to the Development Office to
make up the shortfall on an ongoing basis and provide capital funds through a major fund
drive about every five years.
We need to be able to recruit the best and
ightest talent and provide them with world
class facilities to conduct their research. Asking such high talent to move to Boston is
expensive, especially when you consider its cost of living relative to other centers. Beyond the
ecruitment of leading experts, there are huge expenses in training doctors to do clinical
esearch, especially those researchers that cannot win government grants until they have
proven themselves.
Since her a
ival, Susan Paresky had taken several meaningful steps to focus the fundraising
operations for the Institute. She had rapidly effected changes to the organizational structure of Dana-
Fa
er’s development office (see Exhibit 1), and raised $39.8 million in XXXXXXXXXXSome of the major
changes included the addition of 28 new positions and modification of job descriptions to more
effectively focus development personnel. Paresky commented,
Every day there is an increased need for funds at the Institute. Philanthropic money is
available in the market, but to access it you need a well-organized professional development
team. With an ever-increasing need for funds, we must further reorganize our operations and
This document is authorized for use only by Kristopher Durham in Capstone Experience B - Fall 2021 at Wake Forest University Medical School, 2021.
XXXXXXXXXXThe Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute: Development Strategy
2
establish critical positions to ensure that we are able to meet our targets. An outstanding
question is the level of additional cost the President and Board are willing to tolerate in order
to raise that incremental $5 million per year over the next five years.
Reflecting back on her previous job as Development Dean at Harvard University’s School of
Public Health, Paresky offered,
I am struck by how many avenues we have for fundraising at Dana-Fa
er. At the
University, we relied on alumni for major gifts, but here we have a
oad portfolio of activities
that raise money. On the one hand, that is good news because of the wide variety of ways to
each all levels of donors. But on the other hand, it necessitates thoughtful management and
prioritization of the full portfolio, as some programs are less effective and raise less money
although they may be important for other reasons; some may not even fit with our mission and
image anymore.
We need to develop a clear idea of which opportunities to pursue and which ones to turn
down when, for example, well meaning groups ask our assistance to help them raise less than
$5,000 through small events in honor of a loved one. This question also comes up frequently
with cause marketing proposals. We need to know which opportunities we should pursue and
which we should forgo. Underlying all this is the question of the role of the Development
Office in implementing the vision of the organization. Our role is not simply to raise money,
ut to do it in a manner that is consistent with the strategy of the Institute. In short, we need a
leading edge development strategy attuned to the changing nature of fundraising and a way to
think about how we measure success properly.
The Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute
The Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute, a research and teaching affiliate of the Harvard Medical School,
summarizes its mission as “dedicated to discovery. . . committed to care.” The nationally recognized
Institute was one of the world’s premier cancer research centers. Founded in 1947 by Dr. Sidney
Fa
er, a pioneer in cancer research, the Dana-Fa
er was renowned for its blend of clinical and basic
esearch, and the ability to incorporate the results of its discoveries into improved treatment
techniques for children and adults with cancer.1 The Dana-Fa
er’s research programs focused on
the development of more effective drugs and drug combinations, new measures to reduce the side
effects of chemotherapy and radiotherapy, and the introduction of new treatment technologies for
forms of cancer resistant to standard measures. (See Exhibit 2 for facts about cancer.)
In 1997, the Dana-Fa
er entered into a joint venture with two other major Harvard teaching
hospitals: Massachusetts General and Brigham and Women’s. With the Dana-Fa
e
Partners
CancerCare (DF/PCC) venture, adult oncology services became coordinated across the three
facilities, with outpatient services provided at Dana-Fa
er, inpatient care at Brigham and Women’s,
and both inpatient and outpatient services at Mass. General. In Fe
uary 1997 the integration of
services began with the movement of the Dana-Fa
er’s beds to a newly renovated and enlarged
Brigham and Women’s unit. Subsequently, in December 1997, Dana-Fa
er opened an expanded,
state-of-the-art adult ambulatory treatment center.2 Twelve disease program areas were established3,
1Paths of Progress, DF/JF newsletter, Winter 1998.
2 1997 The Year in Review - DCFI Web site
3 The 12 disease centers were: endocrine, gastrointestinal, genitourinary cancer, head and neck cancer, hematologic
malignancies, hematology, melanoma, neurologic cancer, sarcoma, thoracic,
east cancer, and gynecological cancers.
This document is authorized for use only by Kristopher Durham in Capstone Experience B - Fall 2021 at Wake Forest University Medical School, 2021.
The Dana-Fa
er Cancer Institute: Development Strategy XXXXXXXXXX
3
inging together multidisciplinary teams from the three hospitals to collaborate in the care of adult
patients with specific types of cancer, and to provide a more streamlined approach to clinical research
and testing. Gary Countryman, Chairman of the Board of Trustees for Dana-Fa
er, remarked on the
DF/PCC affiliation,
Dana-Fa
er’s mission is to find a cure for cancer through basic and applied research. To
conduct the research, our doctors need a population of patients to test their discoveries and
treatments. In the cu
ent era of managed care, a small “research” hospital with about 50 beds
is not economically viable. The venture with DF/PCC provides access to a significant patient
pool for research economically, but we must remain true to our research mission and not
ecome drawn too far into the hospital domain. We must constantly ask ourselves whether
what we are doing relates to cancer research. If the answer isn’t yes, we are doing something
wrong.
The Institute researched and treated all forms of cancer. In some cases, disease centers had been
partially funded through gifts and/or grants to address specific cancer research and care. These
included the Gillette Center for Women’s Cancer, the Center for AIDS Research, and the Jimmy Fund
Clinic (specifically devoted to the treatment of children). As of 1997, the Institute was staffed with
approximately 1,600 people, including 634 doctors (MDs, PhDs) comprised of 189 faculty (MDs,
PhDs) and 445 trainees, 236 outpatient and inpatient nurses (RNs), and 350 volunteers. As seen in
Table A below, the Institute’s operating budget was funded through three primary sources: patient
fees, research awards (the Dana-Fa
er ranked third among independent hospitals in the United
States in the National Institute of Health grant awards), and earnings from endowment funds. Any
shortfall was made up by the Development Office’s fundraising efforts.
Table A Dana-Fa
er Financial Profile ($ thousands)
Year-ended September XXXXXXXXXX
Revenues:
Research $93,800 $91,783 $83,447
Patient services, net 77,622 61,800 67,042
Jimmy