International Politics -- Homework #1
This is the first problem set of the semester. This homework is due on September 25th. Please turn it in to your TA (email or paper copy) or at the front of the room BEFORE class starts. Please show your work wherever possible. Each of the 10 questions is worth 10 points. You may consult your notes and the readings but you may not consult with other students or do this in groups. (Note: There are 5 pages here)
Question 1. Consider a scenario where Donald Trump and his cabinet are considering what response to take to the use of chemical weapons in Syria by the Assad regime. The group is considering four options. Suppose they decide to vote their true preferences a stated by choosing between two options at a time, starting with the 1st option vs. the 2nd option. Then, they compare the winner of 1st vs. 2nd to the 3rd option. Then they compare that winner to the 4th option.
1st option: ignore the fact that many civilians were killed by chemical weapons (I)
2nd option: pressure UN to approve sanctions (P)
3rd option: launch a military response (M)
4th option: negotiate with the Bashar al-Assad Government (N)
President: I > P> N > M
Secretary of Defense: M > I > P > N
Secretary of State: P > M > I > N
Vice President: I > P > N > M
National Sec. Advisor: P > N > M > I
a. Which option wins the first round voting? (Hint: 1st option vs. 2nd option)
. Which option wins the second round voting?
c. Which option wins the third round voting?
Question 2. Do the policy choices from Questions 1 violate any of A
ow’s normative criteria (four conditions for fair social choices)? If so, which?
Question 3. Now the Cabinet members decide to adopt the Borda rule. (Recall the Borda rule means for N choices, a voter's top choice gets N-1 points from that voter, 2nd choice gets N-2 and so on)
a. Which option is chosen under the Borda rule?
Please interpret the Borda result. For instance, which decision-maker would prefer the use of the Borda rule? Who would oppose it? Please answer in no more than two sentences.
Question 4. Now suppose a new policy choice is suggested (G), to enter into multi-lateral negotiations. The preference orderings are now the following:
President: I > G > P > N > M
Secretary of Defense: M > I > G > P > N
Secretary of State: P > M > I > G > N
Vice President: I > G > P > N > M
National Sec. Advisor: XXXXXXXXXXP > N > M > I > G
Which option wins using the Borda rule? (Recall the Borda rule means for N choices, a voter's top choice gets N-1 points from that voter, 2nd choice gets N-2 and so on)
Question 5. Does the policy option chosen in question 4 violate any of A
ow’s normative criteria (four conditions for fair social choices) when compared with the policy option chosen in question 3?
Question 6. Explain the importance of A
ow’s Theorem for studying International Politics. Explain its importance in no more than two sentences.
Question 7. Consider that members of Congress are meeting in committee to decide what kind of trade policy to pursue: more free trade policies, more protectionist policies, or just to keep the status quo.
** It is necessary to show your work to receive full credit!
More Free Trade
Fair Trade Activists (16%)
Tea Party (12%)
a. What is the policy choice given the Plurality Rule?
. What is the policy choice given a Run-Off election process?
c. What is the policy choice given Condorcet voting?
Show any additional work here:
Amount of disputed te
itory that B controls
Amount of disputed te
itory that A controls
Pareto Improving Outcomes
With no threat, show the range of outcomes that could make both A and B better off.
9. Looking at the previous question, suppose A has a probability of defeating B equal to 0.80 (so B’s probability of defeating A is XXXXXXXXXXIf A wins a war with B, then A gets all of the disputed land (and B has none). If A loses to B then A gets none of the disputed land (so B has it all). Assume that the war will cost A an amount equal to the value of 20% of the land. [Technical note: Assume utilities are linear with value so that, for instance, 10% of land has a utility of 10; 80 percent of land has a utility of 80 and so forth.] What is A’s expected utility from waging war against B?
10. Continuing with the previous problem. What is the maximum amount of land that B can control and that A can agree to as the division of control over the disputed te
itory so that A will not go ahead with its threat to go to war against B. (Hind: If A is indifferent between waging war and accepting a negotiated agreement, A will accept the negotiated agreement).
Space to show additional work (labeled to link it to a question)